

Report

NUCLEAR POWER SIMULATION

AJAPT - Agents Joint Assessment Planning Tool
Delegations Performance Analysis

SIMULATION carried out in partnership with Uppsala University and the GIRI-hub Lab, Universidade Lusófona, Lusófona Center on Global Challenges. Coordinated by Dr. Sabrina Medeiros (Lusófona University), Dr. Jonathan Hall (Uppsala Peace Lab), and Ph.D. Cand. Giacomo Cassano (Uppsala Peace Lab).

Subject Matter Experts

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Brief History

Simulation was carried out between September 19th and 29th, 2023, with the support of the AJAPT methodology and software, authored by Sabrina Medeiros, Ana Paiva and Cintiene Mendes.

Control Group Team
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Students engage in a simulation, allowing them to explore key course concepts and enhance their understanding of the challenges associated with the strategic dimensions of nuclear power.

Through this experience, invited experts - Subject Matter Experts or SMEs - examine key variables, including strategic thinking, scenario building, adversary behaviour estimation, negotiation skills – such as assertiveness, crisis management, the balance between rational-emotional decision-making – and ethical considerations.

How does it work? The instructors and the GIRI-hub Lab researchers, performing as the Control Group, give the students the conjecture at the beginning of the simulation and further directions. Delegations (actors) will position themselves communicating through the designated online system each game round (3), negotiating for possible solutions to the crisis.

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CASE

DELEGATIONS:

a) Belarus b) Sweden c) Finland d) Poland e) Russia

Day 0 Scenario (fictitious):

- 1) Russia has tried to curtail the West's support for Ukraine by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. During the first few months of the war, Russia's human loss was already more significant than in the Soviet-Afghan war. Material losses can lead Russia to use its nuclear tactical and strategic arsenal.
- 2) Invasions of the airspace of Finland and Sweden performed by the Russians happen more often than ever before.
- 3) The Kaliningrad Oblast is the only Baltic Russia port structure free of ice all year and is the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet. The Kaliningrad district is a nuclear weapons storage bunker, renovated in the last few years. Russia is giving signs of occupying the Suwalki Gap, a corridor between Poland and Lithuania that connects Belarus to Kaliningrad and could serve Russia as a weapon supply chain.
- 4) A negotiation table will begin on September 25th, 2023, in Tanzania. It is based on three rounds of direct negotiations and a continuous diplomatic courier negotiation. Delegations involved in the negotiation format will negotiate directly without the intermediation of third parties. The host's neutrality guarantees the debate's coordination by managing time and apparatus. A binding commitment is expected, but negotiations can be postponed if no agreement is reached.

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PREPAREDNESS

From the first session onwards, delegations respond to the crisis described above and defend their interests in the case as they engage in dialogue with the other delegations through statements and communications. Main topics to consider:

- 1) What are my delegation's maximum and minimum objectives in this scenario?
- 2) How flexible are my objectives?
- 3) What assets do I have at my disposal to help me negotiate a solution to the current crisis?
 - economic strength (e.g., budgets)
 - military capabilities (e.g., foreign military bases, military preparedness)
 - territorial and geographical conditions
 - resources (e.g., food, water and energy)
 - population (e.g., manpower)
- 4) Which allies do I have that I can rely upon to help me resolve the crisis?
- 5) To what extent do the other countries involved trust my delegation to follow through on its promises?
- 6) How might my delegation help create a stable solution to the current crisis?


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SUMMARY OF THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS MADE BY THE SMEs



Negotiation Skills



● Belarus ● Poland ● Lithuania ● Russia ● Sweden

Strategic thinking



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EVIDENCES OF THE DYNAMICS

The image displays the AJAPT (Agents Joint Assessment Planning Tool) interface, version 6.0. The interface is divided into several sections:

- Control Group:** A top navigation bar with icons for a bar chart, a list, and a document.
- Email Messages:** A central pane showing a list of messages. The selected message is from "Poland" dated "9/29/23 at 09:45". The message content includes "Dear Control Group," "The drafts are made between Poland, Sweden and Lithuania.", and a link "x4OGTiisJ3BAEYRHS10pRZS98Z8e00/edit?usp=sharing".
- Actors List:** A right-hand pane titled "Minimax" showing a list of actors: Poland, Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden. Each actor has a "View Minimax" button.
- KML Scenarios:** A bottom pane titled "KML Scenarios" showing a list of scenarios. The selected scenario is "New tensions between Moscow and the West are rising after Lithuania decided to halt the transport of some goods through its territory to the Russian region of Kaliningrad as part of European Union sanctions on the Kremlin." It includes a "NEW SCENARIO" button.

SMEs PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

| Actor | Factor | Qualitative Analysis |
|---------|--|--|
| Belarus | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Regarding the Initial Proposals from the Belarus delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initial Belarus proposals were directed to open a communications channel between Russia and its adversaries. Regarding Russia, the Belarus delegation was focused on bargaining. <p>The Mini/Max points out a better understanding of ways, ends and means available to Belarus in this simulation.</p> <p>The number and coherence of the Belarus Proposals were aligned with its (minimum) goals and crisis management.</p> <p>The cooperation with Poland and Sweden was essential for de-escalating the crisis.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Belarus Delegations for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |
| Belarus | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Initial adversary behaviour estimation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regarding Poland, Sweden and Lithuania, the Belarus delegation was focused on coercive diplomacy through Russian nuclear weapons. <p>However, the Belarus delegation did not estimate the context of extended deterrence (mainly from the USA and UK) that Poland and Lithuania have as NATO members. Russian threats and the deployment of nuclear warheads to Belarus territory only increase the cohesion of the adversaries' alliance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Besides, the presence of Russian nuclear warheads increases the risk of Belarus territory being part of a nuclear battlefield. The deployment of the Russian nuclear warheads contributed to the perception of Belarus as a proxy State of Russia and united its adversaries. The possibility of this initial adversarial behaviour appears not to be seen by the Belarus delegation. |
| Belarus | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Regarding the Initial Communications / Statements from the Belarus delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initial Belarus communications/statements were directed to present Belarus as a possible way to establish other ways of communication between Russia and its adversaries. <p>The Belarus delegation applied the concepts of Bargaining and Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations mainly with Poland.</p> <p>During the crisis, the communications/statements from Belarus were aligned with the minimum goals presented in the Mini/Max.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Belarus Delegation for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |
| Belarus | crisis management | <p>Regarding the initial Crisis Management from the Belarus delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russia, supported by Belarus, escalated the crisis by positioning 50 nuclear warheads (tactical and strategic) in the western portion of Belarus. The claim that these weapons were positioned to protect the Russian population in the Kaliningrad corridor is at odds with the basic concepts of nuclear deterrence. What is Russia and Belarus are trying to "stop" with the deployment of these nuclear weapons? The statement points to an attempt at nuclear blackmail, which could undermine one of the pillars of deterrence: credibility. Furthermore, escalating the crisis contributes to the achievement of which of the objectives listed in Mini/Max? Why? <p>Regarding the initial actions and movements of the Belarus delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Belarus delegation was focused on coercive diplomacy through Russian nuclear weapons. <p>Management of the crisis skills was improved, and the Belarus delegation applied the concepts of Bargaining and Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations with Poland (mainly) and Sweden to de-escalate the crisis.</p> |
| Belarus | adversary behavior estimation | <p>The strategy used by Belarus was primarily aimed at acting tough for the benefit of the security of its borders. However, negotiations began to emerge and benefit economic issues, bringing greater possibilities for pacification. I consider it smart for the Belarusian team to have negotiated another important sector for the country.</p> |
| Belarus | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Sweden had relevant proposals, mainly seeking to be a mediator for cooperation. He could have led this position more to legitimize his role.</p> |
| Belarus | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Russia maintained consistency in communication and speeches to maintain the initial line of guaranteeing the security of its population against NATO advances. He pressured countries to reach a trade outlet via Poland, which was one of his prerogatives.</p> |
| Belarus | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>In this regard, he had the ability to consider that he could have positive gains with other countries and convince Russia to change to guide the region in which nuclear warheads are allocated.</p> |
| Belarus | crisis management | <p>Sweden was able to cooperate and maintain crisis management based on diplomatic mediation.</p> |
| Belarus | assertiveness | <p>Russia was active, maintaining a close position with Belarus and thereby achieving dialogue with adversary countries. It achieved some of its priority objectives.</p> |
| Belarus | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Communication was conveyed excellently, consistently displaying clarity and resemblance to the approach adopted by the real Russian delegation.</p> |
| Belarus | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>They demonstrated a solid understanding of their strategic advantages and how to leverage them in negotiations. I appreciated the positions taken by the Belarusian delegation, striking a balance between being a Russian-influenced state and maintaining its independence.</p> |
| Belarus | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Due to my limited presence, I did not witness any proposals being put forward. Please disregard this grade.</p> |
| Belarus | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Great strategic thinking. Personally, I would have liked to see a bit more initiative in setting up meetings with the "enemy". I do understand the reason given for refraining from engaging, though.</p> <p>Excellent foresight was demonstrated by the delegation. It's unfortunate that the 'Western block' didn't provide ample opportunities for dialogue when they attempted to engage in meetings.</p> |
| Belarus | crisis management | <p>I was not present enough to evaluate this aspect accurately. Please disregard the grade on this point.</p> |
| Belarus | assertiveness | <p>The speeches and communication, overall, were notably assertive. However, I would have appreciated greater participation from other speakers.</p> <p>The communication was strongly assertive. However, I believe the delegation could have been slightly more guarded and strategic in their interactions with the Russian side. This mirrors their real-life approach, albeit to a lesser extent. I would rate them a 4.5, as I didn't find these issues problematic enough to warrant a full-point deduction. Nevertheless, I'm unable to assign fractional points, so I'll round up to a 5.</p> |

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| Belarus | assertiveness | <p>Maintained assertive view concerning lack of Swedens capacity for mediating crisis, western perceived aggression in the crisis and condemning alliance between Sweden and Poland.</p> <p>While lamenting NATO membership not allowing for some troops to be removed. Asserted security concerns to non reciprocal troop movement by Poland.</p> <p>Adamant in refusing the timeframe for troop withdrawal as not acceptable for Belarus.</p> |
| Belarus | adversary behavior estimation | <p>While maintaining several options open, early denying of exercise as cover for invasion and denying of Wagner involvement, showed an awareness of the natural escalating consequences of said events.</p> <p>Later talks with Russia showed concerns about adversary behavior(mainly russian) regarding the drafts early stages.</p> |
| Belarus | crisis management | <p>Able to adapt to context, navigating circumstances as reaction to troop movement/exercise and nuclear warhead movement.</p> <p>Also able to garner other perspectives and translate it to draft options.</p> |
| Belarus | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Early meeting proposals concerning Russia and Poland (suggested bilaterally to share information directly, prevent miscommunication and rumors). Carefull proposal of timing of statement of nunclear warhead movement with Russia.</p> <p>Various efforts to engage stakeholders during the process, proposals stayed few but coherent with ally, context and goals stated.</p> <p>Final draft proposal, coherent with security concerns regarding troop movement from Poland. Could have pushed trade options, concerning its goal of "Belarus reaffirms its commitment to positive policy negotiations regarding green alternatives and improved infrastructure with Poland" as it is left vague in what way trade in general might benefit the max goal of becoming sole exporter of cheese/fertiliser and IT components.</p> |
| Belarus | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Good opening remarks underlying western tactics, tariffs and shortages as reasons to act.</p> <p>Non moderated session with request for retract of Lithuanias opening remarks claiming bad faith and bad start to negotiatipns</p> <p>Firm reaction denying rumours of Wagner involvement, while maintaining contact with Russian delegation. (main ally)</p> <p>followed Russian lead in final discussion, disagreeing from changed words/content from early draft,</p> <p>claims disappointment due to lack of fact checking, and outrage at Sweden, Poland and Lithuania, acusing sweden of failing to mediate any discussion.</p> <p>Able to concede on troop movement vis a vis Poland.</p> <p>Accepted Lithuanias proposal of gradual withdrawal.</p> <p>Belarus communications/statements stay consistent with the proposed min-max goals and initial strategies, playing to its main ally's streights, also able to accomodate and accept suggestions that permit to attain a goal (not a perfect one, but a significant one) that allows for minor gains, while still attaining the majority of the proposed goals.</p> |
| Belarus | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>Naturally deferred many issues to Russian perspective.</p> <p>Never allowed a moment of disappointment to go unnoticed, either in written or verbal formal, tending more for an emotional response, even thou its choices were rational given the circumstance.</p> |
| Belarus | adversary behavior estimation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Perception that only Russia was not against them; - Initially, had the perception that Poland was a bit aggressive; - Initial perception that Sweden could open for a talk. |
| Belarus | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supported the Swedish remind of the focus on the security of the region; - Disaproved the alliance between Sweden and Poland. |
| Belarus | rational / emotional decision making balance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reached an agreement on moving its nuclear arms position. |
| Belarus | adversary behavior estimation | <p>The Belarusian delegation consistently presented its perception of the behavior of other actors in the MIN-MAX. Throughout the negotiation rounds and in the documents produced, it is also possible to verify clarity regarding this aspect</p> |
| Belarus | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>The volume of proposals presented by this delegation was moderate when compared to the other actors in the simulation. Coherence can be identified among the objectives established, the documents produced, and the negotiation rounds.</p> |
| Belarus | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>Despite not having had such an active performance, it is possible to identify basic negotiation skills in terms of maintaining a balance between rational and emotional elements.</p> |
| Belarus | assertiveness | <p>Comparatively, this delegation displayed a moderate performance in terms of assertiveness during the negotiation rounds. The intermediate volume of interactions with other actors was compensated for by the fact that this delegation achieved important objectives already indicated in its MIN-MAX.</p> |
| Belarus | crisis management | <p>Despite Belarus being in a disadvantaged position in the negotiation scenario, the delegation managed to negotiate advantageous agreements that aligned with their initial stance.</p> |

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| Lithuania | adversary behavior estimation | <p>The Lithuania delegation does not estimate the adversarial behaviour (Russia and Belarus) well.</p> <p>Lithuania initiated a crisis regarding the Suwalki Gap without previous arrangements with Poland and other NATO allies.</p> <p>The behaviour/answer of Russia was to escalate this crisis, including with the deployment of nuclear warheads in Belarus. Despite these Russian actions being very questionable in light of the deterrence concept and being much more likely to nuclear blackmail, the Lithuania delegation did not understand that Russia/ Belarus would escalate the crisis by trying nuclear blackmail.</p> <p>Thus, the Lithuania delegation should try to de-escalate the crisis once initiated without reasonably estimating adversarial behaviour. This was not the case until Poland and Sweden implemented strategies and stances to de-escalate the current crisis.</p> |
| Lithuania | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>The Lithuania delegation Mini/Max is not clear. The tool needs to present the minimum goals to be achieved.</p> <p>The lack of minimum strategic objectives indicates a need for more understanding of the ways, ends and means available to Lithuania in this simulation.</p> <p>Regarding the coherence of the Lithuania Proposals, they were aligned with its maximal goal. However, what are the minimum goals to be achieved with the crisis initiated by Lithuania?</p> <p>The lack of minimum objectives is reflected in the number and quality of Lithuania proposals, which were few and very static, pointing out a frozen assessment skill of the crisis dynamic.</p> |
| Lithuania | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Regarding the Communications/Statements from the Lithuania delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The initial Lithuania communication/statement points to Lithuania as the challenger country once Lithuania started the crisis on the Suwalki Gap. - The Communications/Statements of Lithuania were aligned with the country's Maximum Goals. However, Lithuania does not have the means to achieve these goals. So, a significant engagement with Lithuania's allies was necessary to give some credibility to Lithuania's stances. It was not the case; thus, Lithuania's delegation communications/ statements appear more rhetorical than anything capable of achieving its strategic objectives. |
| Lithuania | crisis management | <p>Lithuania initiated the crisis on Suwalki Gap, and its initial management was focused on escalating it even with a lack of minimum goals to be achieved and without the means to support the crisis initiated.</p> <p>The country's delegation did not manage the crisis initiated by Lithuania.</p> <p>The Lithuania delegation held a static position, and Sweden, Poland, and Russia managed the crisis.</p> |
| Lithuania | adversary behavior estimation | Lithuania began its speech with harsh criticism of Russia and Belarus, stating that it would not negotiate any situation other than the total withdrawal of troops. He modified his minimax to the detriment of the realization that certain objectives for that moment would be difficult to achieve. |
| Lithuania | Number and Coherence of Proposals | There was a small number of proposals but it was efficiently integrated into the peace proposals made by partner countries. |
| Lithuania | Consistency of Communications / Statements | He only made one statement. It could have used rapprochement with other countries to make a declaration with greater collective benefits and help implement lasting peace. |
| Lithuania | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>He was rational in his negotiations, especially when he changed his MINIMAX and achieved his objective with the removal of warheads from close to his borders.</p> <p>The delegation's performance displayed a lot of rational thinking behind the scenes, which is a positive aspect given the setting</p> |
| Lithuania | assertiveness | The speeches were consistently assertive and well-structured. Apart from the formality point mentioned earlier, the arguments and contributions from the delegation were more than promising. |
| Lithuania | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Possible Draft Statements between Poland, Lithuania and Sweden.</p> <p>Various updates on allies concerning russian meetings.</p> <p>open to discuss the EU sanctions on humanitarian resources for Kaliningrad, but we stand strong that we believe that the threat of nuclear weapons is not in anyone's best interest.</p> <p>Trilateral talks among Poland, Sweden and Lithuania</p> <p>Open session points to valid concerns, about aid being a cover for insidious activities, and for using the Suwalki Gap, urging Sweden as a future NATO member to come together and commit to humanitarian help option.</p> <p>Technical error delays Lithuania further response but remarks are madeSuggested gradual troop withdrawal, accepted by Belarus.</p> <p>Claims hands tied in EU sanctions but flexible on exercises issue.</p> <p>about the risk of nuclear options and Article 5 consequences.</p> <p>Lithuania active on number of proposals and coherent with common objectives, proposed gradual withdrawal of troops in regards to Belarus/Poland offer way out of impasse.</p> |
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| Lithuania | adversary behavior estimation | <p>- Supported the initial Swedish speech; - Explicitly against crimes and dictatorates.</p> |
| Lithuania | Consistency of Communications / Statements | - Met with Poland and Sweden, as predicted. |
| Lithuania | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Initial concerns pointed to dangers to national security, due to nuclear warheads. Open session points to valid concerns, about humanitarian aid being a cover for insidious activities. Few statements but active communication through inbox/outbox, who pointed to consistent concerns and demands</p> |
| Lithuania | Number and Coherence of Proposals | - It could have had more contact and initiatives with Sweden. |
| Lithuania | crisis management | - The surveillance established by Poland and Lithuania against Russia's transport of nuclear weapons was aligned to the bilateral cooperation expected, specially in this type of security topic. |
| Lithuania | rational / emotional decision making balance | Stayed rational during all stages of negotiations, even when Belarus/Russia asked in non moderated session for a retract of Lithuanias opening remarks claiming bad faith and bad start to negotiations (racist/genocidal regime issue). Final discussion saw Russia asking for Lithuania to stay out of domestic issues with no change in emotional stage/perspective. |
| Lithuania | assertiveness | <p>Opening remarks were quite strong, appealing to illegal and genocidal invasion by Russia of its peaceful and democratic neighbor Ukraine. Lithuania is not willing to concede any demands put forward by the Russian Federation in its ongoing attempt to quell and subjugate a sovereign nation.</p> <p>Later objectives were revised concerned Ukraine objectives.</p> <p>Still, Lithuania stood firm and adamantly stating the policies and not the states were illegal and racist/genocidal, when confronted by Belarus/Russia.</p> <p>Stood on imperative of nuclear threat and necessity of closing a deal.</p> |
| Lithuania | crisis management | Able to have hard stances concerning nuclear options and inspection of vehicles by Russia and assertive reluctance to retract initial statements concerning the opposing regimes. However, showed flexibility on exercise issue and willingness to cooperate, and offered gradual withdrawal of troops as a way out of stalemate in final stages of negotiations and crisis. |
| Lithuania | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Possible Draft Statements between Poland, Lithuania and Sweden. Various updates on allies concerning russian meetings. open to discuss the EU sanctions on humanitarian resources for Kaliningrad, but we stand strong that we believe that the threat of nuclear weapons is not in anyone's best interest. Trilateral talks among Poland, Sweden and Lithuania Open session points to valid concerns, about aid being a cover for insidious activities, and for using the Suwalki Gap, urging Sweden as a future NATO member to come together and commit to humanitarian help option. Technical error delays Lithuania further response but remarks are made. Suggested gradual troop withdrawal, accepted by Belarus. Claims hands tied in EU sanctions but flexible on exercises issue. about the risk of nuclear options and Article 5 consequences.</p> <p>Lithuania active on number of proposals (mainly in meetings and messages, with few statements) and coherent with common objectives, proposed gradual withdrawal of troops in regards to Belarus/Poland offer way out of impasse.</p> |
| Lithuania | adversary behavior estimation | The Lithuanian delegation only marginally presented its perception of adversaries' behavior in the Min-Max. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Min-Max update (on September 27) marked a significant improvement in framing the actor's perspective regarding the ongoing negotiations. |
| Lithuania | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Initial min-max objectives pointed to unattainable objectives and thus a misperception of what the adversary was willing to concede, as well as Lithuanians own strengths to make claims.</p> <p>Legitimate concerns about Russian adherence to its word and national security issues. Understandable fears of being cut off from Europe if Russia takes over Suwalki Gap.</p> |
| Lithuania | Number and Coherence of Proposals | The volume and coherence of the Lithuanian delegation were quite limited when compared to the other actors. |
| Lithuania | Consistency of Communications / Statements | Although some of the pre-established objectives of Lithuania were achieved, the proposals from the mentioned delegation were not aligned with the developments observed in the simulation by the second round of negotiations. |
| Lithuania | crisis management | The crisis management capability of Lithuania was compromised by the lower number of interactions conducted with the other delegations. |
| Lithuania | assertiveness | The fact that this delegation achieved some of its objectives contributed to a moderate performance in terms of "assertiveness." This actor knew how to leverage partners with greater power resources during the negotiations. |
| Lithuania | rational / emotional decision making balance | Despite the delegation not having reached the primary pre-established objectives, it was observed during the negotiations that the group successfully directed certain discussions. Fundamental negotiation skills were evident in maintaining an equilibrium between rational and emotional aspects. |
| Poland | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Poland - Consistency of Communications / Statements The initial Poland communications/statements were directed to present Poland as open to dialogue with Russia without accepting any blackmail or threat to its territorial integrity. The Poland delegation applied the concepts of Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations mainly with Russia. During the crisis, the communications/statements from Poland were aligned with the management to de-escalate the crisis. Congratulations to Poland's delegation for approaching and understanding the Conciliatory Strategy.</p> |

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| Poland | adversary behavior estimation | <p>The Poland delegation understands the adversarial behaviour (Russia and Belarus) well.</p> <p>The Poland delegation appeared to understand that Russia/ Belarus escalated the crisis by trying nuclear blackmail. However, in the long term, this behaviour undermines the credibility of Russia's use of these weapons.</p> <p>Poland's delegation adopted a strategic stance of not provoking Russia unnecessarily during a crisis started by Lithuania).</p> <p>From this estimative, the Poland delegation adopted a strategy to present itself as open to dialogue with Russia without accepting any blackmail or threat to its territorial integrity.</p> |
| Poland | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Poland - Number and Coherence of Proposals</p> <p>The Poland delegation's proposals were directed to present Poland as open to dialogue with Russia without accepting any blackmail or threat to its territorial integrity.</p> <p>Regarding Russia, the Poland delegation was focused on a Conciliatory Strategy, remaining steady in its goals. However, the minimum goals of the Poland Delegation need more clarity.</p> <p>For example: "No export of weapons to countries other than NATO, use the defence for the security of Polish citizens, borders and sovereignty."</p> <p>Does this imply stopping supporting Ukraine?</p> <p>There seems to be confusion between Ends, Ways and Means. This second minimum goal is a way to achieve some unstated objective.</p> <p>Despite the apparent confusion in the Mini/Max, the number and coherence of the Poland Proposals were well-shaped to de-escalate the crisis.</p> <p>Negotiating with Sweden, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia was essential for de-escalating the crisis.</p> |
| Poland | crisis management | <p>Poland's crisis management was focused on not being intimidated by the Russian / Belarus nuclear Blackmail and simultaneously adopting the Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations with all countries involved to de-escalate the crisis.</p> <p>However, the crisis management adopted by Poland's delegation was not clearly aligned with its goals presented in the Mini/Max.</p> |
| Poland | adversary behavior estimation | <p>The Polish team's strategy was to bring together dialogue with partners to gain strength in negotiations. With this, they even managed to close an agreement with Belarus</p> |
| Poland | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>The proposals were consistent with MINIMAX even achieving the removal of nuclear weapons from the proximity of its border.</p> |
| Poland | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>Their negotiations were important for mobilizing the actors. It brought Sweden into greater dialogue in the search for peace. Later he managed to get closer to Belarus and, even in the face of tough speech from Russia, he continued to address its sovereignty.</p> |
| Poland | assertiveness | <p>It was highly assertive in negotiating with Belarus, achieving one of her MINIMAX objectives</p> |
| Poland | adversary behavior estimation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focused on the Russia and Belarus corridors; - Supported Lithuania and Sweden, this one only in the written part, initially. |
| Poland | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A stronger bilateral cooperation was made with Sweden. |
| Poland | rational / emotional decision making balance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negotiated with Belarus about moving its nuclear weapons position. |
| Poland | crisis management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The surveillance by Poland and Lithuania of the Russia's commitment not to transport nuclear weapons was aligned to the initial bilateral discussions. |
| Poland | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Met with Sweden and Lithuania, as predicted in the initial registers; - Few registers referring to NATO. |
| Poland | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Due to my limited presence, I did not witness any proposals being put forward. Please disregard this grade.</p> |
| Poland | crisis management | <p>I was not present enough to evaluate this aspect accurately. Please disregard the grade on this point.</p> |
| Poland | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Early talks mentioned NATO and Article 5 consequences, estimating a possible deterrent to nuclear opponents. Suwalki Gap left undecided upon, left room for maneuvering in the future of the crisis. Trilateral talks between Poland, Sweden and Lithuania (changed meeting time). Able to talk with Belarus.</p> <p>Poland entered a military alliance with Sweden strengthening its position in the Baltic. While being able to respond on par to escalation of the crisis by Belarus and Russia (with the placement of nuclear warheads and troops exercises at the border)</p> <p>Overall, Poland knew NATO's umbrella would be an option in the face of a nuclear threat from Russia, and the behavior estimation and response was fairly adequate.</p> |
| Poland | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Actively pursuing talks with all sides.</p> <p>The number of proposals ranged from actual alliances, to bilateral documents with Belarus, waving Article 5 when seeing fit to and accommodating when needed.</p> <p>One of the most active actors regarding proposals and meetings.</p> |
| Poland | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>The statements of Poland stayed consistent through the crisis, being able to show flexibility but not hesitating in arguing for consequences of Article 5 in case Russia overstepped its boundaries.</p> <p>This pondered stance is evident in supporting Lithuania's sovereignty against aggressive actions publicly (while covertly telling Russia that the message was mere posturing and should not be taken as too firm a stance).</p> |
| Poland | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>Mostly rational behavior, making concessions and veiled threats.</p> <p>Poland accommodates Russian needs and offers to monitor vehicles and control transport of Russian material, but shows intransigence, not backing down into perceived Belarussian escalation (exercise near border and possible Wagner involvement) and Russian demands, points to possible closure of Suwalki Gap. After accommodating Russian demands in early stages, feels outraged and supports Lithuania in protecting its sovereignty as response to placement of nukes. Ultimately questioning Russia about violating Swedish airspace and nukes as escalating factor.</p> <p>Supports Lithuania's sovereignty against aggressive actions (while covertly telling Russia that the message was mere posturing and should not be taken as too firm a stance)</p> <p>Final talks bring convergence in the discussions pre-meeting to not mention Wagner Group. A concession that allows for objectively seeking common gains.</p> |
| Poland | assertiveness | <p>Diplomatic path open and talks encouraged while stressing the NATO option and consequent Article 5 repercussions in case of aggression to both Russia and Belarus.</p> <p>Flexible in general but assertive in matters of national security, mainly the placement of the nuclear warheads.</p> <p>After accommodating Russian demands in early stages, feels outraged and supports Lithuania in protecting its sovereignty as response to placement of nukes, however is still able to meet the adversaries and concede several points towards major objectives.</p> |

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| Poland | crisis management | <p>One of the actors most called upon to act, either by troop movements by Belarus near the border and rumoured Wagner involvement, by the placement of nuclear warheads, or violation of airspace.</p> <p>Poland tried to escalate accordingly (firmly using Article 5), but also conceding several points towards an attainable objective (dropping the Wagner concerns of the latter talks)</p> <p>It actually met all parties involved, set treaties with most and managed appropriately the mutating context of the crisis.</p> |
| Poland | adversary behavior estimation | The Polish delegation exhibited a strong performance in terms of reading the scenario and understanding the behavior of adversaries. The delegation consistently presented their stance concerning most of the game's actors, including Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden, in its Min-Max document. |
| Poland | Number and Coherence of Proposals | In terms of volume and coherence of documents and agreements, Poland delivered an excellent performance. The content of their statements, the MIN-MAX, and their speeches were fully aligned. |
| Poland | Consistency of Communications / Statements | In comparative terms, Poland was one of the delegations that made the most use of diplomatic correspondence. Furthermore, the delegation demonstrated a high level of consistency, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the documents produced. |
| Poland | assertiveness | This delegation's performance was characterized by assertiveness and proactivity. These elements were crucial in achieving some of the pre-established objectives. |
| Poland | crisis management | Although the delegation performed well in crisis management, some of their maximum objectives were not achieved. This fact ultimately compromised the evaluation in this aspect. |
| Poland | rational / emotional decision making balance | It is possible to infer, from the documents produced and the negotiation rounds, a good balance between rational and emotional elements in the decision-making process. |
| Russia | crisis management | <p>Russia - Crisis Management</p> <p>Regarding the initial Crisis Management from the Russian delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Russian delegation escalated the crisis deploying 50 nuclear warheads (tactical and strategic) in the western portion of Belarus. The claim that these weapons were positioned to protect the Russian population in the Kaliningrad corridor is at odds with the basic concepts of nuclear deterrence. • What is Russia trying to "stop" with the deployment of these nuclear weapons? • The statement points to an attempt at nuclear blackmail, which could undermine one of the pillars of deterrence: credibility. • Furthermore, escalating the crisis contributes to the achievement of which of the objectives listed in Mini/Max? Why? <p>The initial communications signalled Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden as a new Russian demand for territory expansion.</p> <p>Regarding the initial actions and movements of the Russian delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Russian delegation was focused on coercive diplomacy through nuclear weapons. • The central issue was: What assets does Russia assess its goals? Just nuclear weapons? <p>The mini/Max updated on 27 September 2023 was a significant improvement and points out a better understanding of ways, ends and means available to Russia in this simulation.</p> <p>The Russian delegation updated the perception of other assets available to achieve some of the aims expressed in the Mini/Max.</p> <p>Management of the crisis skills was improved, and the Russian delegation applied the concepts of Bargaining and Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations with Poland to de-escalate the crisis.</p> <p>The Agreement between Russia and Poland was an outstanding achievement regarding the Russian access to Kaliningrad Oblast by land (related to the Minimum Goal number 3).</p> |
| Russia | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Russia - Adversary Behavior Estimation: Initial adversary behaviour estimation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regarding Poland, Sweden and Lithuania, the Russian delegation was focused on coercive diplomacy through nuclear weapons. <p>However, the Russian delegation did not estimate the context of extended deterrence (mainly from the USA and UK) that Poland and Lithuania have as NATO members. Russian threats only increase the cohesion of the adversaries' alliance.</p> <p>The mini/Max updated on 27 September 2023 was a significant improvement and points out a better understanding of ways, ends and means available to Russia in this simulation.</p> <p>The Russian delegation updated the perception of other assets available to achieve some of the aims expressed in the Mini/Max, as well as improved the adversary behaviour estimation.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Russian Delegations for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |
| Russia | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Regarding the Initial Communications/Statements from the Russian delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The initial Russian communications/statements signalled Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden as a new Russian demand for territory expansion. • The Russian delegation was focused on coercive diplomacy through nuclear weapons. <p>The Mini/Max updated on 27 September 2023 was a significant improvement and points out a better understanding of ways, ends and means available to Russia in this simulation.</p> <p>The Russian delegation updated the perception of other assets available to achieve some of the aims expressed in the Mini/Max.</p> <p>Strategic Thinking was improved, and the Russian delegation applied the concepts of Coercive Diplomacy, Bargaining and Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations with Poland.</p> <p>The Communications / Statements were realigned according to this improved strategic Thinking.</p> <p>The Agreement between Russia and Poland was an outstanding achievement regarding the Russian access to Kaliningrad Oblast by land (related to the Minimum Goal number 3).</p> <p>Congratulations to the Russian Delegations for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |

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| Russia | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Regarding the Initial Proposals from the Russian delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The initial Russian proposals were directed to the Belarus Delegations • Regarding Poland, Sweden and Lithuania, the Russian delegation was focused on coercive diplomacy through nuclear weapons. <p>The mini/Max updated on 27 September 2023 was a significant improvement and points out a better understanding of ways, ends and means available to Russia in this simulation.</p> <p>The Russian delegation updated the perception of other assets available to achieve some of the aims expressed in the Mini/Max.</p> <p>After these, the number and coherence of the Russian Proposals increase in number and quality to achieve one or more of its minimum goals.</p> <p>The Agreement between Russia and Poland was an outstanding achievement regarding the Russian access to Kaliningrad Oblast by land (related to the Minimum Goal number 3). It directly resulted from rational proposals to de-escalate the crisis according to the Russian goals.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Russian Delegations for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |
| Russia | adversary behavior estimation | Russia carried out a good strategy for MINIMAX and continued dialogue with the partner country Belarus and with adversary countries. It achieved results that were foreseen in the initial design of its strategy, especially when it comes to the commercial activity corridor. It managed, through Belarus, to ensure that its objectives were achieved. |
| Russia | Number and Coherence of Proposals | The Russian delegation managed to consistently adhere to their objectives during the negotiations and was rationality flexible so that, at the expense of the passage of food and other activities through Poland, they could cancel their activities involving warheads close to the border. |
| Russia | rational / emotional decision making balance | The Russian delegation managed to consistently adhere to its objectives with the negotiations and was rationality flexible so that, at the expense of the passage of food and other activities through Poland, it could cancel its activities involving warheads close to the border. |
| Russia | adversary behavior estimation | Great strategic thinking. Personally, I would have liked to see a bit more initiative in setting up meetings with the "enemy". I do understand the reason given for refraining from engaging, though. |
| Russia | Number and Coherence of Proposals | Due to my limited presence, I did not witness any proposals being put forward. Please disregard this grade. |
| Russia | Consistency of Communications / Statements | Communication was conveyed excellently, consistently displaying clarity and resemblance to the approach adopted by the real Russian delegation. |
| Russia | rational / emotional decision making balance | I didn't have the opportunity to witness the entirety of the negotiations, but based on what I did see, it's apparent that the delegation effectively asserted their positions. They demonstrated a solid understanding of their strategic advantages and how to leverage them in negotiations. |
| Russia | assertiveness | The speeches and communication, overall, were notably assertive. However, I would have appreciated greater participation from other speakers. |
| Russia | crisis management | I was not present enough to evaluate this aspect accurately. Please disregard the grade on this point. |
| Russia | adversary behavior estimation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Perception of lack space for negotiation; - Need of open corridors; - Perception that Lithuania was not so open; - Believe the Sweden independent role as a mediator was not necessary; - Believe in incoherence accusations of human rights violations (with the justification of a non present country accusation). |
| Russia | rational / emotional decision making balance | - Accepted the nuclear weapons move and its surveillance. |
| Russia | Consistency of Communications / Statements | - Few references to NATO, but considerable ones in the discussions. |
| Russia | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supported Belorussia; - Remained against Sweden's independent position, specially when this country started an alliance with Poland. |
| Russia | adversary behavior estimation | The Min-max strategy does not offer an in-depth analysis of adversaries' behavior. However, throughout the negotiations and in the definition of agreements, it is possible to observe a clear view of this variable, indicating that this delegation has developed situational awareness over the course of the exercise. |
| Russia | Number and Coherence of Proposals | In general terms, it can be asserted that the Russian delegation displayed a consistent performance in terms of the volume and coherence of its proposals. However, the fact that they emphasized the issue of Ukraine in the Min-Max but then did not explore this point during the negotiations ultimately compromised this actor's performance regarding this aspect. |
| Russia | Consistency of Communications / Statements | While the Russian delegation exhibited significant consistency throughout the negotiations, it was observed that the delegation's strategy did not enable the attainment of the primary objectives outlined in the Min-Max. |
| Russia | rational / emotional decision making balance | Despite the delegation not having achieved the main pre-established objectives, it was observed during the negotiations that the group managed to steer some of the discussions. Basic negotiation skills were evident in terms of maintaining a balance between rational and emotional in the decision making process. |
| Russia | assertiveness | As a regional power, Russia had a greater opportunity to assert its dominance through assertiveness. The stronger bargaining capacity of this state could have been better leveraged throughout the negotiations to achieve the objectives set by Russia, but this aspect was not as thoroughly explored by the delegation. |
| Russia | crisis management | The Russian delegation was quite active in crisis management, a fact that can be observed in the volume of correspondence with other actors and in the proposals for agreements. |
| Russia | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Opening remarks and later deploy 50 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in the Western parts of Belarus in order to protect the Russian population in Kaliningrad rapidly escalated the crisis and forced moves from other delegations.</p> <p>This strong move was accompanied by bringing forth the fact that regrettably Sweden didn't initiate any conversations with them and question Sweden's ability to operate as an independent mediator primarily due to the fact that it has created a military alliance with Poland. (Reply from Sweden to include Russian voice and non aggressive stance) Reducing the role and credibility of Sweden as mediator and lessening its role.</p> <p>Against charges of racism/genocide Russia sides with Belarus regarding Lithuania to redact its initial statement of racism/genocide from Russian regime, also pointing out that ICJ has case against Ukraine for acts of aggression against Russian people in the Donbass.</p> <p>Russia while the biggest player involved showed curious moves, by not using the Baltic fleet to apply pressure, nor staging a popular demonstration in the large diaspora residing in Lithuania.</p> |

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| Russia | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Opening remarks of equal and valued partners, contrasted with Russian demands of direct land access to Kaliningrad, in order to protect the Russian people.</p> <p>Brings forth the fact that regrettably Sweden didn't initiate any conversations with them and question Sweden's ability to operate as an independent mediator primarily due to the fact that it has created a military alliance with Poland.</p> <p>Non-moderated session brings a concordance with Belarus Statement for Lithuania to redact its initial statement of racism/genocide from Russian regime, also pointing out that ICJ has case against Ukraine for acts of aggression against Russian people in the Donbass.</p> <p>The proposals stayed few in initial stages, overshadowed by actions like the placement of nuclear weapons in western Belarus and several leveraging factors regarding Kaliningrad.</p> <p>Coherence of proposals and actions was uniform along the crisis.</p> |
| Russia | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Alignment with Belarus a logical constant, communication wise.</p> <p>Non-moderated session brings a concordance with Belarus Statement for Lithuania to redact its initial statement of racism/genocide from Russian regime, also pointing out that ICJ has case against Ukraine for acts of aggression against Russian people in the Donbass</p> <p>Opens session renews need to recognize the will of the Russian people about the formerly contested regions of Ukraine, backs Belarus claim of Sweden's ability as a mediator, while asserting no connection to Wagner group prohibited by Russian law. Russia sees no need for Polish and Swedish alliance and defiantly states that Suwalki Gap will remain open if Russia wills it. Sweden in NATO raises legitimate security concerns for Russia and nuclear placement is only to protect ally (Belarus) while stating that Swedish alleged airspace violation is merely a security precaution</p> <p>Also clever dropping of Ukraine pretensions, letting go of major gain, for a minor one, that allowed negotiations on Suwalki issue carry on.</p> <p>Insistence on Russia's zero tolerance of meddling of outsiders in domestic policies/issues was also evident in the crisis.</p> |
| Russia | rational / emotional decision making balance | <p>Decision making was coherent but emotional in parts (mainly domestic issues and threat of ending all negotiations)</p> <p>Decision making per se showed depth.</p> |
| Russia | assertiveness | <p>An assertive pattern was visible since the initial stages of the crisis, with the min-max established. As in, Crimea being a legitimate part of the Russian Federation is an absolute non-negotiable. And Ukraine not being a NATO member an imperative as well.</p> <p>The discourse contained demands that contrasted with the requests of other actors, defiantly stating afterwards that Suwalki Gap will remain open if Russia wills it.</p> <p>Talks in final meeting showed assertiveness in no first use clause, claiming national security issues understandably. Also clever dropping of Ukraine pretensions, letting go of major gain, for a minor one, that allowed negotiations on Suwalki issue carry on.</p> <p>Dissatisfied by not being included in talks that changed wording of draft. Russia threatened to end talks all together and let agreement fall. The only actor to do so.</p> <p>Issues with limiting non-essential personnel (limited to Suwalki Gap only) and dissatisfied with lack of revisions to sanction by Lithuania. Telling Lithuania to stay out of Russia's domestic issues.</p> |
| Russia | crisis management | <p>In regards to crisis management, Russia demanded but allowed concessions towards its stated goal.</p> <p>Letting the questions of Ukraine be sidelined (in a calculated way, with several possibilities equated) in favour of more pressing matters.</p> <p>Agreed with Poland few Polish troops in the border and Belarus and Russia have agreed to move the 50 strategically deployed nuclear weapons towards the eastern border of Belarus and to only have essential personnel through the territory.</p> <p>Poland has agreed to Russia transporting food, coal, timber, metals, timber, building materials, personnel, medicine and weapons to Kaliningrad. In exchange, Russia agrees not to transport nuclear warheads or fissile materials through Polish territory and the Suwalki Gap</p> <p>Communicating harshly with Lithuania and Poland, but acting in a way to further the Kaliningrad agenda (opting for less or no airspace violations of Sweden, no nuclear materials in agreed territories and general agreement with Belarus clauses).</p> |
| Sweden | adversary behavior estimation | <p>The Swedish delegation understands the adversarial behaviour of Russia and Belarus well.</p> <p>The Swedish delegation appeared to understand that Russia/ Belarus escalated the crisis by trying nuclear blackmail. However, in the long term, this behaviour undermines the credibility of Russia's use of these weapons.</p> <p>From this estimative, the Swedish delegation adopted a strategy to present itself as a communications channel with all the parties and remain steady in its goals.</p> |
| Sweden | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>Regarding the Initial Proposals from the Sweden delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initial Sweden delegation proposals were directed to present Sweden as a communications channel between all the parties in the crisis. Regarding Russia, the Sweden delegation was focused on a Conciliatory Strategy, remaining steady in its goals. <p>The Mini/Max points out a better understanding of ways, ends and means available to Sweden in this simulation.</p> <p>The number and coherence of the Belarus Proposals were aligned with its goals and crisis management.</p> <p>Negotiating with Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia was essential for de-escalating the crisis.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Sweden Delegations for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |
| Sweden | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Regarding the Initial Communications / Statements from the Sweden delegation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initial Sweden communications/statements were directed to present Sweden as a reliable actor to establish other ways of communication between Russia and its adversaries. <p>The Sweden delegation applied the concepts of Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations mainly with Russia.</p> <p>During the crisis, the communications/statements from Sweden were aligned with the aims presented in the Mini/Max.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Sweden Delegation for the Strategic Thinking improvement during the simulation.</p> |

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| Sweden | crisis management | <p>Sweden's crisis management was focused on not being intimidated by the Russian / Belarus nuclear Blackmail and simultaneously adopting the Conciliatory Strategy through negotiations with all countries involved to de-escalate the crisis.</p> <p>The crisis management adopted by the Sweden delegations was aligned with its goals presented in the Mini/Max.</p> <p>Congratulations to the Sweden Delegation for the negotiation skills presented during the simulation.</p> |
| Sweden | adversary behavior estimation | Sweden achieved its objectives with negotiations between countries already foreseen in its MINIMAX objectives. He managed to get Russia to agree not to invade its airspace and was not pressured not to join NATO |
| Sweden | rational / emotional decision making balance | Its negotiation is rational, using peaceful and mediation mechanisms to seek peace for the region and the materialization of its objectives such as the security of its airspace and Russia's acceptance of non-invasion of Swedish airspace. |
| Sweden | assertiveness | She was very assertive in positioning herself as a mediator in the conflict. Achieved greater deterrence with partners to put pressure on Russia and Belarus |
| Sweden | adversary behavior estimation | <p>Initially entering a military alliance with Poland (asked for revisions in agreement with Poland to better serve self interest/security) was a move that offered the best security prospects to Sweden, however, when it comes to adversary behavior estimation, the best option for Sweden, turned out to be detrimental to its future role in the crisis, as its role as mediator was logically put into question.</p> <p>Perhaps unofficial support (like in the relation to Lithuania, with a statement) was a better option.</p> <p>Failed to approach Russia in the early stages, claims time constraints dictated which stakeholders were approached first (Exceeded discourse time).</p> |
| Sweden | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <p>General coherence to avert airspace violation and mediating role (though sparsely recognized by Russia/ Belarus) in negotiations.</p> <p>Assured Russia that intends to bridge divides and include Russian voice in discussion regardless of talks with other stakeholders first (stating Russian importance but talking to it last).</p> <p>In multi-lateral discussion, raised questions about Swedish goods taking a toll on its economy/assets, by intervening in the moving of humanitarian goods to Kaliningrad. Economic goals/assets were not a worry of min-max stated goals, but its understandable as a tactic in discussion.</p> <p>Exchange of information on the meeting with allies and Russia was coherent, but sent suggestion to Russia/Belarus for a joint agreement, without consulting Lithuania by omission, promptly assuring Lithuania however of its informal character.</p> |
| Sweden | assertiveness | <p>Seriously contested in its role of mediator/impartial actor, due to its alliance with Poland, allowed statements to linger in discussions.</p> <p>Never assertive as to the necessity of the alliance, in the face of this disapproval of its mediator role. Asserted security concerns regarding airspace violations.</p> |
| Sweden | assertiveness | <p>Seriously contested in its role of mediator/impartial actor, due to its alliance with Poland, allowed statements to linger in discussions.</p> <p>Never assertive as to the necessity of the alliance, in the face of this disapproval of its mediator role. Asserted security concerns regarding airspace violations.</p> |
| Sweden | crisis management | <p>Tried to maximize mediator role despite opponents' views.</p> <p>Called for specifics on points of contention of Belarus/Russia. Clarifies previous statement about Russia's position on non-essential personnel in latter stages of negotiations.</p> |
| Sweden | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <p>Communication stayed consistent with perceived role of mediator, averting airspace violations and general resolution of crisis.</p> <p>Condemns placement of nuclear warheads in western Belarus.</p> <p>Declares openness to listen to all actors.</p> |
| Sweden | assertiveness | <p>Seriously contested in its role of mediator/impartial actor, due to its alliance with Poland, allowed statements to linger in discussions.</p> <p>Never assertive as to the necessity of the alliance, in the face of this disapproval of its mediator role. Asserted security concerns regarding airspace violations.</p> |
| Sweden | crisis management | <p>Tried to maximize mediator role despite opponents' views.</p> <p>Called for specifics on points of contention of Belarus/Russia. Clarifies previous statement about Russia's position on non-essential personnel in latter stages of negotiations.</p> |
| Sweden | rational / emotional decision making balance | Stayed centred in the discussions, didn't let the contested mediator role escalate the negotiations, even though it wasn't assertive, it didn't let it get emotional and in the way of objectives. |
| Sweden | adversary behavior estimation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Perception of Belarus a bit aggressive; - Keeping it vague. |
| Sweden | Number and Coherence of Proposals | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposal to be the mediator, which is coherent with its diplomatic profile; - However, ended up in an alliance with Poland. |
| Sweden | Consistency of Communications / Statements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Met with Poland and Lithuania; - Mentioned the UN with certain frequency. |
| Sweden | rational / emotional decision making balance | -Strongly against no first strike, which is coherent with the Swedish (foreign) policy about nuclear weapons. |
| Sweden | adversary behavior estimation | The Swedish delegation delivered an excellent performance in the "adversary behavior estimation" aspect. Clarity regarding the balance of power and the role of the state they were representing in the face of the crisis can be identified in the Min-Max, documents, and speeches of this actor. The mentioned delegation demonstrated a high level of situational awareness. |
| Sweden | Number and Coherence of Proposals | The Swedish delegation exhibited a commendable performance when it came to both the quantity and consistency of their proposals, all of which closely adhered to the maximum and minimum objectives defined by the group at the outset of the simulation. This positive performance is further underscored by the delegation's success in attaining some of their objectives and crafting an agreement proposal that aligned seamlessly with the country's position throughout the negotiation rounds. |
| Sweden | Consistency of Communications / Statements | This delegation was highly active during the negotiation rounds as well as in exchanging messages and scheduling meetings to address the crisis proposed during the simulation. The strategy adopted by this actor was consistent and closely aligned with the objectives outlined by the delegation. |
| Sweden | assertiveness | Overall, the Swedish delegation demonstrated a strong performance in terms of assertiveness. However, there was a slight lack of employing a more proactive strategy, which could have enabled this actor to propose an agreement before the Agreement between Poland and Russia. |

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| Sweden | rational / emotional decision making balance | It was observed during the negotiations that the group managed to steer some of the discussions. Basic negotiation skills were evident in terms of maintaining a balance between rational and emotional elements. |
| Sweden | crisis management | The Swedish delegation performed well in managing the simulated crisis. However, there was a need for them to develop a more effective strategy to neutralize Russia. |